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POLICING HATE SPEECH AND EXTREMISM:
A TAXONOMY OF ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION
Leonard M. Niehoff*
Hate speech and extremist association do real and substantial harm to 
individuals, groups, and our society as a whole. Our common sense, experience, 
and empathy for the targets of extremism tell us that our laws should do more to 
address this issue. Current reform efforts have therefore sought to revise our laws to 
do a better job at policing, prohibiting, and punishing hate speech and extremist 
association.
Efforts to do so, however, encounter numerous and substantial challenges. We 
can divide them into three general categories: definitional problems, operational 
problems, and conscientious problems. An informed understanding of these three 
categories of arguments is indispensable to any effort that seeks to reform the law 
in ways that will survive constitutional scrutiny. 
This Article provides a detailed legal and normative analysis of those 
arguments and common objections raised to them. It contends that the arguments 
raised in opposition to more expansive regulation of hate speech and extremist 
association largely get things right. And it concludes that more expansive 
regulation could have dire and unintended consequences that would disserve the 
interests of all, including the groups who advocate for such regulation.  
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States1 provides one 
of the most influential defenses of the protection of free expres-
sion found in Supreme Court case law.2 Toward the beginning of 
that opinion, however, Holmes offers an observation about our 
natural predisposition toward the suppression of the opinions that 
we find offensive. “Persecution for the expression of opinions,” he 
wrote, “seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your 
premises or your power and want a certain result with all your 
heart [then] you [will] naturally express your wishes in law and 
sweep away all opposition.”3
There is currently a great deal of public dialogue about why our 
laws do not do more to police, prohibit, and punish extremist or-
ganizations and the hateful speech that serves as their stock-in-
trade. Holmes’s insight helps us understand why the impulse to do 
so seems, on its face, “perfectly logical.” After all, what reasonable 
person could doubt the premise of such an impulse—that such 
speech and association pose real risks and dangers? Extremist ideo-
logies have been linked to the promulgation of hate toward minor-
ity groups,4 to violent criminal activity,5 and even to efforts to un-
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See Leonard M. Niehoff & Deeva Shah, The Resilience of Noxious Doctrine: The 2016 
Election, the Marketplace of Ideas, and the Obstinacy of Bias, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 243, 248 
(2017).
3. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
4. For overviews of extremist organizations and their activities in promoting hate and 
bias, see Defining Extremism: A Glossary of White Supremacist Terms, Movements and Philosophies,
ADL, https://www.adl.org/education/resources/glossary-terms/defining-extremism-white-
supremacy (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); Extremist Files: Groups, S. POVERTY L. CTR.,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/groups (last visited Aug. 23, 2018);
see also White Supremacist Propaganda Nearly Doubles on Campus in 2017-18 Academic Year, ADL,
https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/white-supremacist-propaganda-nearly-doubles-on-
campus-in-2017-18-academic-year (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
5. See, e.g., William Parkin, Brent Kline, Jeff Gruenewald, Joshua Freilich, & Steven 
Chermak, Threats of Violent Islamist and Far-Right Extremism: What Does the Research Say?, START
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.start.umd.edu/news/threats-violent-islamist-and-far-right-
extremism-what-does-research-say; Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2017: An ADL 
Center on Extremism Report, ADL, https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/murder-and-
extremism-in-the-united-states-in-2017 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); With Hate in Their Hearts: 
The State of White Supremacy in the United States, ADL, https://www.adl.org/education/
resources/reports/state-of-white-supremacy (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); A.C. Thompson, Ali 
Winston, & Darwin BondGraham, Racist, Violent, Unpunished: A White Hate Group’s Campaign 
of Menace, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 19, 2017, 2:01 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/white-
hate-group-campaign-of-menace-rise-above-movement.
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dermine or overthrow the government of the United States.6 In 
addition, it can be argued that a government’s failure to condemn 
and penalize extremism has the effect of normalizing it and there-
by making it even more dangerous.7 As a result, it seems natural to 
want “with all your heart” to identify the groups that advance ex-
tremist ideologies and engage in hateful speech, to prosecute 
them, and to put them out of business or otherwise silence them.
And why should we refrain from doing so? Unlike the United 
States, many other countries have adopted laws that punish hate 
speech,8 a comparative reality captured by the very title of an arti-
cle called Hate Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World.9
Furthermore, private entities like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter 
have implemented policies that ban at least some such communi-
cations.10 These measures by other governments and by influential 
private parties prompt sensible questions about our hesitancy to 
incorporate similar provisions in our federal and state laws. Almost 
a decade ago, two legal scholars tapped into these impulses when 
6. For a list of violent extremist groups that includes many with ideologies hostile 
to the United States government, see What Are Known Violent Extremist Groups?,
FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/what-are-known-violent-extremist-groups
(last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
7. See Wajahat Ali, Deradicalizing White People, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 16, 2018, 12:25 
PM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/08/16/deradicalizing-white-people/?utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=NYR%20Goldberg%20the%20DNC%20Naipaul&utm_
content=NYR%20Goldberg%20the%20DNC%20Naipaul+CID_bae1a7a4c2db0e361ae7352a
42073b79&utm_source=Newsletter&utm_term=Deradicalizing%20White%20People. It has 
also been argued, however, that overly harsh government suppression of extremist groups 
can result in problematic “backlash effects.” See Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, & 
David Caspi, Critical Events in the Life Trajectories of Domestic Extremist White Supremacist Groups,
8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 497, 521 (2009).
8. See Brian Levin, Extremism and the Constitution, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 714, 725–26 
(2001) (describing anti-hate-speech statutes that have been adopted in other countries); 
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? 56–59 (1997) (listing efforts 
by other countries to adopt anti-hate measures); Comparing Hate Speech Laws in The U.S. and 
Abroad, NPR (Mar. 3, 2011 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134239713/
France-Isnt-The-Only-Country-To-Prohibit-Hate-Speech; European Hate Speech Laws, LEGAL 
PROJECT, http://www.legal-project.org/issues/european-hate-speech-laws (last visited Aug. 
23, 2018); John C. Knechtle, Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European Union,
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 47 (2008).
9. Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech—The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53 ME. L. REV.
487 (2001). For a discussion and critique of the comparison of black-letter norms as be-
tween the United States and Europe, see Eric Heinze, Wild-West Cowboys Versus Cheese-Eating 
Surrender Monkeys: Some Problems in Comparative Approaches to Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH 
AND DEMOCRACY 182 (2009) (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds.).
10. See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Alex Jones and Infowars Content Is Removed from Apple, Facebook, and 
YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/technology/
infowars-alex-jones-apple-facebook-spotify.html?emc=edit_th_180807&nl=todaysheadlines
&nlid=663780750807; Kate Conger & Jack Nicas, Twitter Bars Alex Jones and Inforwars, Citing 
Harassing Messages, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/
technology/twitter-alex-jones-infowars.html?emc=edit_th_180907&nl=todaysheadlines
&nlid=663780750907.
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they titled their book Must We Defend Nazis?,11 a question strongly 
suggesting a negative answer by sheer force of common sense.
This Article, prepared in conjunction with the symposium “Alt-
Association: The Role of Law in Combating Extremism” organized 
by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, seeks to identify 
and describe the principal categories of arguments that have been 
advanced against government efforts to silence hate speech and to 
constrain and punish extremist association.12 While it may seem 
“perfectly logical” and intuitively clear that our government should 
have the authority and the means to combat extremism, this Arti-
cle attempts to provide a taxonomy of the most influential—and, 
in my view, most persuasive—objections to that logic and those in-
tuitions. A law reform effort that does not take these arguments in-
to consideration is, in my judgment, condemned to failure, or 
worse, to a success with unintended consequences and ominous 
implications.
To be clear: I do not doubt that hate speech and extremist asso-
ciation raise serious and legitimate concerns that deserve our at-
tention. Nor do I maintain that we are powerless to address a 
number of the gravest evils that we associate with these phenome-
na. I do, however, believe that law reform projects that have sought 
to address extremism have often failed to account adequately for 
the contravening arguments they will need to surmount. This Arti-
cle categorizes and explores those arguments, not in an attempt to 
frustrate anti-extremism law reform efforts, but in an effort to 
highlight doctrinal problems, convey cautionary tales, and clarify 
matters so that we do not waste any more time doing things that do 
not work, that courts will not uphold, and that could lead to perni-
cious results.13
Arguments against the policing of hate speech and extremist as-
sociation fall into three categories. The first category includes def-
11. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 8.
12. This Article focuses primarily on government efforts to restrain extremist speech 
and association through criminal law. The objections raised here apply with equal force, 
however, to government attempts to curtail such speech and association through other 
means, such as tort law. The Article does not address those special circumstances where the 
government has greater latitude to restrict speech under existing First Amendment doc-
trine, for example, with respect to the speech of public employees.
13. In the interest of full disclosure, I generally subscribe to the principle that the rem-
edy for the speech we hate is more speech. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This approach has recently been the subject of additional 
strategic creativity, for example in efforts by minority groups to reclaim certain slurs and 
derogatory terms. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (involving an Asian-
American band’s effort to reclaim “Slant” through the trademark registration process). Still, 
I acknowledge that some quarters find this response inadequate and will continue to try to 
work toward other legal solutions to the problems created by hate speech and extremist as-
sociation.
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initional arguments that focus on problems of vagueness and over-
breadth. Any effort to use the law to combat extremism calls the 
question of what “extremism” means, how someone would know if 
they were doing it, and whether we can target it without sweeping 
into our net some forms of speech and association that we wish to 
protect.14
The second category includes operational arguments. Even if we 
can arrive at satisfactorily clear and narrow definitions of operative 
terms, at the implementation stage we may discover that the con-
cept of extremism does not contribute anything of practical utility 
to the achievement of our underlying public policy goals. In addi-
tion, we may not trust government officials to enforce anti-
extremist laws in fair and evenhanded ways, particularly given the 
flexibility inherent in prosecutorial discretion. Finally, we may wor-
ry that authorities could use anti-extremism measures in ways that 
would disadvantage the very groups such laws are often adopted to 
protect.
The third category includes conscientious arguments that go to 
the very heart of the anti-extremism project. Even if we can define 
extremism with sufficient clarity and specificity, and even if we can 
operationalize the concept of anti-extremism in useful and nondis-
criminatory ways, we must still ask whether we really want “the cer-
tain result” that will follow from enforcing such laws. Extreme po-
litical and religious ideologies are political and religious still, and 
they therefore implicate matters of conscience and the right to be-
lieve what we will, a right that our law generally views as sacrosanct. 
14. Throughout this Article, I use the words “extreme,” “extremist,” “extremism,” and 
“hate speech.” I do so out of necessity. They provide a rough shorthand for a complex col-
lection of phenomena and ideas. I generally use “extremist” terms to refer to any speech, 
association, or ideology that stands “substantially outside of belief systems more generally 
accepted in society (i.e., ‘mainstream beliefs’).” Extremism, ADL, https://www.adl.org/
resources/glossary-terms/extremism (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). I do this recognizing that 
other people use narrower definitions of these terms, for example to refer more specifically 
to speech, association, and ideologies that are so “offensive to basic societal norms or so dis-
ruptive to critical social goals” as to raise the sensible question of whether their costs sub-
stantially outweigh their benefits. See Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, General Introduction: Free 
Speech, Democracy, and the Suppression of Extreme Speech Past and Present, in EXTREME SPEECH 
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 123, 130. Some people use the terms, more specifically still, 
to refer to the “hate speech” that we link to groups like the Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan and 
that targets a specific group because of a characteristic like race, religion, gender, or sexual 
orientation. Id at 127. This is the sense in which I use “hate speech” here. Finally, some peo-
ple use extremist terms to describe, yet more specifically, the religious views that we connect 
with certain radical sects or the anti-government ideologies associated with some militia and 
anarchist groups. See What Is Violent Extremism?, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-
website/what-is-violent-extremism (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). That my definition (or any 
other) works adequately for purposes of discussion of these issues here does not mean that it 
suffices as statutory language or other expressions of public policy. My use of these terms 
therefore should not be taken as an implicit concession that they bear sufficiently clear and 
specific meanings to serve as bases for statutory proscription and punishment.
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Any anti-extremism enterprise requires us to assess the wisdom of 
putting the government in the business of trying to regulate ex-
pressions of human conscience. That may trouble us, even when 
the expression at issue seems so perverse and morally corrupt that 
we view it as the equivalent of no conscience at all.
This Article will begin with a discussion of the doctrinal connec-
tion between speech and association. It will then examine some 
basic due process issues and the three categories of arguments dis-
cussed above. Along the way, it will consider some of the principal 
objections that dissenters have raised to these arguments—and will 
discuss the difficulties with those objections. And this Article will 
conclude by asking whether—if we could put all of these argu-
ments aside and adopt the sorts of anti-extremism measures that 
the law currently prohibits—we would be happy with the result. 
Spoiler alert: I think not.
I. FREE ASSOCIATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Before embarking on a detailed taxonomy of the arguments 
raised against the suppression of extremism, it is important to rec-
ognize the close relationship that exists between freedom of 
speech and freedom of association. Indeed, throughout this Article 
I will treat those freedoms as intertwined, even as interchangeable. 
First Amendment doctrine requires us to think of them as deeply 
conjoined concepts. For purposes of First Amendment doctrine, it 
makes no sense to talk about hate speech and extremist association 
as if they stand apart and raise wholly distinct questions.
The First Amendment expressly addresses six subject matters: 
the establishment of religion, the exercise of religion, speech, the 
press, assembly, and petitioning the government.15 It nowhere 
mentions a right to association, although the constitutions of some 
other countries do explicitly provide for one.16 Many people, and 
more than a few federal courts, nevertheless mistakenly believe 
that the First Amendment includes an association clause,17 perhaps 
reflecting the logical force of the idea that the rights to practice re-
ligion, to speak, to assemble, and to petition must necessarily entail 
a right to do these things collectively.
Indeed, the Supreme Court inferred the right of free association 
from the right of free expression. The relevant case law here be-
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. Chapter II, § 18.
17. See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 568 (2010).
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gins with NAACP v. Alabama,18 where the Attorney General of Ala-
bama sued the NAACP for allegedly failing to comply with certain 
statutes regulating entities doing business in that state. In the 
course of the lawsuit, the Attorney General sought the membership 
list of the Alabama branch of the organization. The Supreme 
Court held that the production order issued by the trial court car-
ried with it the “likelihood” of a “substantial restraint” on the “right 
to freedom of association [of the NAACP members].”19
The Supreme Court grounded this right to freedom of associa-
tion in the right to free speech; in this sense, freedom of associa-
tion is a derivative right, implied from the presence of another.
The Court noted that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and pri-
vate points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association.”20 The Court declared that free-
dom of association “is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
embraces freedom of speech.”21 And the Court described the 
breadth of this free association right in sweeping terms: “Of
course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced
by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural 
matters.”22 The resulting principle is therefore simultaneously ex-
pansive (protecting group association for the purpose of advancing 
points of view on a vast array of matters) and narrow (protecting 
group association only if it has that purpose).23
In the years immediately following the NAACP case, the Court 
considered the argument that this right to freedom of association 
afforded a defense to members of the Communist Party who were 
being prosecuted under the Smith Act.24 In two cases decided on 
18. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
19. Id. at 462.
20. Id. at 460.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. It should be noted that, in recent years, the Court’s freedom of association cases 
have often involved the correlative right not to associate with certain individuals or ideas. See,
e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984). Because government restrictions on extremist speech and association do not, in my 
view, implicate the right not to associate, I will not further explore this line of free associa-
tion case law in this Article. For the same reason, I will not here explore the concept of “in-
timate association” alluded to by the Court in some cases. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18.
24. Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, commonly known as the Smith Act, in 
June of 1940. The Act set criminal penalties for advocating the overthrow of the United 
States government by force or violence. The Court upheld the Act against a constitutional 
challenge in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 
(1957), however, the Court distinguished (a) advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the gov-
ernment as an abstract doctrine from (b) advocacy toward action and that specific end, i.e., 
a form of incitement to violence. The Court held that the Smith Act reached the latter but 
not the former and reversed the convictions of the fourteen defendants before the Court.
866 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 52:4
the same day in 1961, the Court held that the Act did not violate 
that right because it only exposed certain members of the Party to 
prosecution.25 The Court concluded that the membership clause of 
the Act did “not make criminal all association with an organization 
that has been shown to engage in illegal advocacy.”26 Rather, it 
reached only those “active” members who knowingly acted with the 
specific intent of accomplishing the aims of the organization—the 
overthrow of the United States government—by resort to vio-
lence.27 Combining to achieve this unlawful aim did not amount to 
a protected association, but to an illegal conspiracy.28 Members 
who did not so combine could not be prosecuted under the Act by 
virtue of their membership in the organization alone.
These cases introduce three themes that will inform our taxon-
omy of arguments against the regulation of hate speech and ex-
tremist association. First, they hint at one of the primary difficulties 
inherent in discussing “extremism”—the subjective, elusive, and 
culturally (even locally) determined meaning of the term. In 1958, 
the Attorney General of Alabama, along with many other public of-
ficials and private citizens of the state, doubtless viewed the NAACP
as an “extremist” organization working to upset the status quo of 
segregation. It seems unlikely that the same view prevails, for ex-
ample, in the State of Vermont today. Similarly, after the First and 
Second World Wars, government and public anxiety around the 
“extremist” philosophy of Communism drove irrational fears and 
correspondingly irrational policies. Our present concerns about 
Russia and China probably have much more to do with election 
tampering and trade than they do with worries about an ideologi-
cal “Red Menace.”29 This theme will be especially present in the 
category of definitional arguments, although we will encounter it 
in operational and conscientious arguments as well.
Second, these cases make clear that the right to freedom of as-
sociation exists only in conjunction with the protection of a differ-
ent and foundational First Amendment right.30 As Justice Brennan 
25. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 
(1961). In Scales, the Court affirmed the conviction below; in Noto, it reversed.
26. Scales, 367 U.S. at 229.
27. Id. at 229–30. See also Noto, 367 U.S. at 299.
28. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 227.
29. In this vein, Robert Post observes that, “Hate speech regulation imagines itself as 
simply enforcing the given and natural norms of a decent society . . . but from a sociological 
or anthropological point of view we know that law is always actually enforcing the mores of 
the dominant group that controls the content of law.” Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME 
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 130. As Post observes, the current impulse to pro-
hibit hate speech is, in this sense, closely analogous to the historic impulse to prohibit blas-
phemy. Id. at 127.
30. I put aside here the “intimate association” doctrine referenced in note 23, supra.
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reiterated in a later case, “the Court has recognized a right to asso-
ciate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the 
First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guaran-
tees freedom of association of this kind,” he added, “as an indis-
pensable means of preserving other individual liberties.”31 As noted 
earlier, freedom of association is thus a derivative right, one that 
depends on the existence of a predicate right to do something 
else. The reasons for protecting extremist association therefore 
necessarily intersect with the reasons for protecting extreme 
speech, extreme religious beliefs and practices, and so on. We will 
encounter this theme in every category of argument: our thinking 
about association necessarily entails our thinking about speech, 
and vice versa.
Finally, these cases may prompt us to wonder what, if anything, 
the concept of extremism adds to the analysis. For example, if, 
consistent with the First Amendment, the government has the au-
thority to punish speech that the speaker knowingly and intention-
ally deploys to incite individuals to imminent lawless and violent 
action, then labeling the speech as extremist does not seem to do 
any work. In thinking through our taxonomy of arguments against 
the suppression of hate speech and extremist association, we will 
need to bear this issue in mind. After all, if the First Amendment 
protects extremist beliefs, speech, or religious convictions simplicit-
er, then we must identify the additional factors (for example, the 
incitement of imminent violence) that allow us to punish it. And if 
those additional factors self-sufficiently make the behavior in ques-
tion punishable, then we may conclude that the extremist label 
contributes nothing to our thinking. We will encounter this theme 
in our consideration of all three categories of argument, although
it will play its greatest role in connection with operational argu-
ments.
These cases introduce these themes. I will return to all of them 
later.
II. A TAXONOMY OF ARGUMENTS
As noted above, we can divide the arguments raised against the 
policing of hate speech and extremist association into three cate-
gories: (A) definitional arguments, (B) operational arguments, 
and (C) conscientious arguments. These categories of arguments 
31. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (emphasis added).
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identify significant problems that efforts to suppress hate speech 
and extremism necessarily entail. They do not, however, derive 
their persuasive power from our conviction that any given hateful 
or extremist position has merit, or serves as a positive social influ-
ence, or even makes sense. To the contrary, these arguments apply 
even where we feel agnostic, or downright hostile, toward the hate 
and extremism that the government seeks to address.
This means that at least one additional category of arguments 
exists: substantive arguments in support of specific extremist views. 
In short, someone might contend that the government should not 
regulate or punish a given extremist position because that view is 
right or passes some minimum threshold of defensibility. I have 
put such arguments aside here, in part because they turn on the 
facts and merits of individual cases, and in part because when 
those arguments are right, they dictate an obvious conclusion: the 
state should not interfere. In contrast, when we advocate against 
the suppression of forms of extremism that we condemn or about 
which we at least have deep reservations, the arguments point in 
less obvious directions and raise much more interesting issues. For 
purposes of discussing these categories of arguments, I have there-
fore taken the rightness of any particular hateful or extremist posi-
tion off the table.32
A. Definitional Arguments
Those who advocate for laws prohibiting and punishing hate 
speech and extremist association often claim that our First 
Amendment doctrine goes too far, does not adequately account 
for the dignity and other interests of the groups that extremism 
targets, and reflects a regrettable American exceptionalism.33 In 
this section, I will offer a sympathetic view of the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment decisions, particularly with respect to the defini-
tional challenges that anti-extremism and anti-hate-speech laws 
pose. As I will discuss, the Court’s jurisprudence has focused on 
two types of problems commonly present in such laws: they are 
unworkably vague, leaving people to speculate whether the statute 
prohibits the behavior in question, and they are overly broad, en-
compassing speech and association we want to protect along with 
32. This might seem unnecessary with respect to hate, which we may believe we can 
universally condemn. But I assume here—without taking on the burden of trying to prove—
that individuals of good conscience may be morally justified in hating ideas (inequality), 
institutions (slavery), or even other individuals (tyrants).
33. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2014).
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that we want to proscribe. In an effort to avoid these problems, leg-
islatures have tried to craft laws that focus on the consequences of 
speech and association rather than on speech and association 
themselves. As I will show, however, that move has not solved the 
infirmities of these statutes.
Before reaching these First Amendment principles, however, we 
need to recognize that such laws also pose serious problems under 
basic notions of due process—both as a normative concept and as 
a principle protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In our dia-
logues about these issues we tend to stress the distinctive approach 
that United States courts take to freedom of expression and to ig-
nore entirely the related concerns about due process that also per-
tain.
1. Due Process
Our concept of due process requires that a law—particularly a 
penal statute that puts someone’s liberty, property, or life at risk—
must meet certain standards of specificity. Thus, in Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co.,34 the Supreme Court declared that a “statute . . .
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it 
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penal-
ties.”35 In contrast, a statute that “either forbids or requires the do-
ing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion, violates the first essential of due process of law.”36
At its essence, due process assures that someone being subjected 
to legal proceedings will receive notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.37 A statute fails to satisfy even those minimal guarantees, 
however, if a reasonable individual cannot determine whether his 
or her conduct runs afoul of the law and cannot discern the kinds 
of facts and arguments that would rebut an accusation that it did. 
Franz Kafka’s The Trial famously puts the evils of the dilemma on 
full display: throughout the novel, the protagonist, Joseph K., re-
mains uncertain of the nature of the offense he allegedly commit-
ted and therefore finds himself unable to offer any sort of de-
fense—right up until the moment of his execution, “like a dog.”38
34. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
35. Id. at 391.
36. Id.
37. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
38. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 251 (Willa and Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 1968) 
(1937).
870 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 52:4
A law that does not reasonably inform a person of what he has 
done wrong, and thereby deprives him of the opportunity to de-
fend, does little for the interests of human agency and dignity. Nor 
is dignity much advanced by a law whose ambiguity may result in 
forced silence on the part of those who choose not to act or a 
wrongful conviction on the part of those who do. That such a law 
rests on noble ideals or good intentions does not rehabilitate and 
justify it.39 Again, these concerns—grounded in due process prin-
ciples—exist independent of those that arise when free expression 
and association are involved. As we turn to our analysis of laws at-
tempting to regulate extremism, it is critical to remember that they 
may raise not only First Amendment problems of vagueness and 
overbreadth, but foundational due process problems as well.
2.  Vagueness, Speech, and Association
The concerns raised by vague statutes extend beyond due pro-
cess when the law implicates speech. In Grayned v. City of Rockord,40
the Supreme Court listed three concerns raised by such laws.41 The 
first is the notice problem just identified: “we insist that laws give 
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”42
The second concern relates to enforcement: “laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them,” or those officials may 
execute them in “arbitrary and discriminatory” ways.43 Like inade-
quate notice, capricious or biased enforcement poses serious prob-
lems with respect to any vague statute. But these concerns become 
particularly grave with respect to statutes that target speech and as-
sociation.
I will discuss enforcement issues in greater depth later when I 
address some of the operational arguments that can be raised 
against policing hate speech and extremist association. I prelimi-
39. People can reach different conclusions on this point, as is demonstrated by an ex-
change between the poet Stephen Spender and the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre at a writ-
er’s conference in 1956. Spender asked Sartre, a champion of Marxism at the time, whether 
he would allow his friends to campaign for his release from a Communist prison if he had 
been wrongfully convicted of a crime but his exoneration would injure the Party. Sartre re-
plied that he would not press for his freedom. Spender said: “It seems to me that the only 
good cause has always been that of one person unjustly imprisoned.” Sartre replied that
“perhaps in the modern world ‘injustice against one person is no longer the point.’” SARAH 
BAKEWELL, AT THE EXISTENTIALIST CAFÉ 247 (2016).
40. Grayned v. City of Rockord, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
41. Id. at 108–09.
42. Id. at 108.
43. Id.
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narily note now, however, that vagueness creates its own serious en-
forcement problems. Consider, for example, Herndon v. Lowry.44 In 
that case, the defendant had pamphleteered on behalf of the 
Communist Party and, as a result, was convicted under a vague 
Georgia statute that prohibited “combined resistance to the lawful 
authority of the State.”45 The Supreme Court reversed, declaring 
that “the statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a 
dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of 
government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have fore-
seen his words would have some effect in the future conduct of 
others . . . .”46
Vague standards thus allow a law enforcement officer to make 
an arrest, a prosecutor to bring charges, a judge to find probable 
cause, and a jury to return a guilty verdict—all because they do not 
like the speaker or the point of view expressed. In short, vagueness 
facilitates abuse, allowing for the punishment of unpopular 
speech. And this offends the very purpose of the First Amendment, 
because popular speech does not need its protection.
The third concern identified by the Court in Grayned—that 
vagueness will cause people to behave with an abundance of cau-
tion—also has special relevance to statutes that restrain and punish 
speech. “Uncertain meanings,” the Court observed, “inevitably lead 
citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”47 Where 
the statute “abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms,” this tendency will necessarily “inhibit the exercise of 
[those] freedoms.”48 In other words, people will respond cautiously 
when faced with a statute vague in its terms and scope; they will ac-
cordingly stay well away from the statute’s ambiguous borders; and, 
when that statute targets speech, this excessive wariness will have 
the effect of artificially limiting First Amendment rights and con-
straining their full exercise. Such a result inverts our expressed 
priorities under longstanding First Amendment doctrine. In this 
way, vague statutes take breathing space away from speech and give 
that latitude to government efforts to regulate or punish expres-
sion and association. Under our First Amendment doctrine, which 
I believe largely gets matters right, this has things exactly back-
wards.
44. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
45. Id. at 253.
46. Id. at 263–64.
47. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
48. Id.
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Consider, for example, the Court’s imposition of constitutional 
limitations on certain defamation claims in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.49 The Court there held that public official plaintiffs in 
defamation cases must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant acted with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge 
of falsity or in reckless disregard of it.50 The Court acknowledged 
that this demanding standard would render some false speech 
practically unpunishable and therefore protected. But the Court 
declared that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, 
and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the ‘breathing space’ that they need to survive.”51 In other 
words, if we seek to protect all true speech then we have to protect 
some false speech as well.
This same concept is reflected in the Court’s approach to craft-
ing exceptions to First Amendment protection. The Court has rec-
ognized only a few categories of unprotected speech and has 
shown no interest in creating additional unprotected categories to 
deal with new issues—like horrifically violent video games that find 
their way into the hands of minors or films of fetishistic animal tor-
ture.52 And, more to the point, the Court’s definitions of the histor-
ically unprotected categories of speech (like obscenity,53 “fighting 
words,”54 and true threats55) have a conspicuous narrowness to 
them, leaving protected a great deal of speech that many of us 
would find offensive, obnoxious, valueless, and perhaps even dan-
gerous. Our First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved in just 
this way, with the Court constructing buffer zones around catego-
ries of unprotected speech so as to err in favor of free expression. 
As observed above, vague statutes create uncertain areas of poten-
tial punishment—the exact opposite of a buffer zone.
We can imagine two objections to this buffer zone approach and 
to these arguments about why vague laws that target speech and as-
49. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50. Id. at 279–80.
51. Id. at 271–72 (citation omitted).
52. See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–804 (2011) (striking down a 
California law banning the sale of certain violent video games to children without parental 
permission); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (striking down a federal law 
that criminalized certain depictions of cruelty to animals).
53. See Miller v. California, 415 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (declaring that the First Amend-
ment does not protect “obscenity” but adopting a three-part test that renders only some 
sexually explicit material “obscene”).
54. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). Although the Court 
there held that the First Amendment does not protect fighting words, as I discuss infra, at 
pp. 881–82, the Court later substantially narrowed that doctrine.
55. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (holding that although the 
First Amendment does not protect a “true threat,” it does protect political hyperbole and 
vehement, caustic, and unpleasantly sharp verbal attacks on public officials).
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sociation pose special problems. The first goes to one of the under-
lying premises—specifically, the behavioral assumption that un-
clear laws will chill people from engaging in speech that contrib-
utes to public discourse. Someone might fairly ask: do we really 
believe—particularly in this age of ubiquitous and unfettered 
online communication through social media and other channels—
that human beings are so easily cowed?
One answer to that objection focuses on the significance of the 
speech of any particular person. As Geoffrey Stone has observed, 
free speech is relatively easily chilled “because our individual act of 
expression is unlikely to make a difference.”56 We therefore tend to 
believe that the addition or absence of our voice will not matter 
much, if at all—especially with regard to big issues over which we 
have no direct control, like public policy. As Stone points out, 
however, “if many people are individually chilled, the overall im-
pact on public discourse can be quite dramatic. This is why courts 
formulating First Amendment doctrine generally pay special atten-
tion to the dangers of chilling effect.”57 Furthermore, while the 
vigor of expression on the Internet may tell us something about 
how freely people speak when they do not feel chilled, it tells us 
nothing about how those same people would respond if our First 
Amendment doctrine shifted to validate restrictions on and pun-
ishments of “extreme” speech.
The second objection to the buffer zone approach goes to the 
ultimate conclusion of the argument—that incentivizing people to 
behave cautiously when they speak, and when they associate with 
others to do so, is a bad thing. Someone might understandably ask: 
what’s wrong with trying to encourage people to act carefully and
responsibly when they speak? Don’t we do that with respect to a 
host of other activities?
In some cases, the Supreme Court has resorted to a curious 
stratagem to dispose of this second objection. In essence, the Court 
has hinted that we can afford to give the speech in question free 
rein because, well, we can’t take it seriously enough to think it 
dangerous.58 For example, in Herndon—the Communist pamphlet-
eering case—the Court variously describes the speech at issue as 
56. Geoffrey R. Stone, Chilling Effect, HUFFPOST (Feb. 16, 2007), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/chilling-effect_b_41430.html.
57. Id.
58. In the same vein, Roger Shattuck has observed that censorship efforts can “be in-
terpreted as attributing more efficacy, more significance, and therefore more potential risk 
to ideas and words than does a policy of unrestricted free speech.” In this sense, Shattuck 
argues, “[t]olerance belittles.” ROGER SHATTUCK, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE: FROM 
PROMETHEUS TO PORNOGRAPHY 27 (1996).
874 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 52:4
“foolish,” “pernicious,” and “vague.”59 And Justice Holmes uses 
even more dismissive language in the midst of his otherwise rhap-
sodic defense of free speech in Abrams, referring to the “leaflets”
before the Court as “poor and puny anonymities” that express a 
“creed” of “ignorance and immaturity.”60
A skeptical assessment of whether the specific speech at issue 
poses any actual danger to anyone may provide a helpful reality 
check, but it does not dispose of the general objection that people 
should act cautiously when speaking. After all, that the speech at 
hand may seem relatively harmless does nothing to prove that the 
same holds true for all speech. Indeed, such a claim would lead us 
into a deep inconsistency, on one hand celebrating the power and 
importance of free expression while on the other waving it off as 
ineffectual and insignificant.61
No, in order to be persuasive, a response to the second objec-
tion—the critique that people ought to be more careful with their 
words—must acknowledge that the speech we want to protect can 
have serious adverse consequences. And, indeed, our First 
Amendment jurisprudence protects a great deal of speech that can 
result in real and substantial harm. To take a straightforward ex-
ample: the knowingly false and constitutionally unprotected state-
ment described by the Court in Sullivan can ruin someone’s repu-
tation and destroy his or her life; but then so can a completely true 
and constitutionally immunized statement about the same person. 
In fact, it seems likely that true statements will generally do greater
injury to a person’s reputation than false ones—but we protect 
them anyway.62 We therefore might reframe the second objection 
more precisely this way: given that words can do real harm, what’s
wrong with having rules that will persuade people to act cautious-
ly—even very cautiously—when they speak?
59. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 249–50 (1937).
60. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61. There are contexts in which considering the negligible impact of a given instance 
of speech is legitimate. Consider, for example, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). In that case, a teacher was dismissed from his employment for sending to a local 
newspaper a letter in which he was critical of the manner in which the school board and 
superintendent had addressed revenue issues. After conducting a hearing, the board con-
cluded that the teacher’s conduct had been “detrimental” to the school and so terminated 
him. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal violated the teacher’s First Amendment 
rights. The Court noted that teachers do not lose their First Amendment right to speak 
about matters of public importance simply by virtue of their public employment. And the 
Court further observed that there was no reason to believe that the speech had in fact been 
detrimental to the school. “So far as the record reveals,” the Court declared, the letter was 
greeted by everyone but the board with “massive apathy and total disbelief.” Id. at 570.
62. In fact, in the early seventeenth century English courts took the position that “even 
a true libel could be criminally punished” and an “oft-quoted maxim” held that “the greater 
the truth the greater the libel.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME 42 (2004).
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The doctrine responds by recognizing that speech we character-
ize as incautious can have substantial value. Speech may be viewed 
as incautious because it insults the powerful, or undermines the 
status quo, or upsets the dominant paradigm, or sparks outrage. 
But, in many cases, knowledge advances, freedom is secured, and 
progress occurs only because the powerful are confronted, the sta-
tus quo gets upended, the dominant paradigm is replaced, or out-
rage energizes an otherwise inert people.
We cannot say the same for most other activities in which hu-
man beings engage: there is no value, for example, in taking an in-
cautious approach to driving a car, manufacturing pharmaceuti-
cals, introducing your aggressive dog to strangers, or serving 
alcohol to someone who appears intoxicated. We adopt laws re-
quiring caution when engaging in those activities because that’s
how we want people and entities to behave when they do those 
things. In the case of speech, we don’t just tolerate greater risk-
taking, we encourage it—and in part we do so because expression 
is so easily chilled for the reasons discussed above.
3.  Overbreadth
Laws that seek to punish extremist speech and association raise 
another kind of definitional problem, which the Supreme Court 
has addressed through the doctrine of overbreadth. The over-
breadth doctrine comes into play when the language of a law 
reaches speech that the First Amendment does not protect—but 
also speech that it does. So, for example, a statute that prohibited 
“visual depictions of naked minors” would apply to child pornog-
raphy, but it would also apply to a textbook on pediatric medicine 
or to a folio on Renaissance art. In the same vein, a statute that 
prohibited “speech that stigmatizes a minority group” would apply 
to the statements of extremist groups, but also to Shakespeare’s
The Merchant of Venice.
The overbreadth doctrine is both important and problematic. 
On one hand, the doctrine does essential work in protecting 
speech. Legislatures have a natural and understandable impulse to 
overreach: after all, any problem worthy of a legislative solution 
would seem to demand a broad and thorough one. As I have pre-
viously observed, the Supreme Court has had so many occasions to 
strike down statutes on overbreadth grounds because of a pseudo-
Newtonian principle of lawmaking: “For every action, there is an 
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unequal and opposite overreaction.”63 The overbreadth doctrine 
forces a course correction as against this impulse. The Court has 
therefore allowed for its aggressive application, for example creat-
ing a special exception to the law of standing in order to permit a 
plaintiff to attack an overly broad statute even though the plain-
tiff’s own conduct is “clearly unprotected and could be proscribed 
by a law drawn with the requisite specificity.”64
On the other hand, the Court has recognized that holding a law 
unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds is “strong medicine” and 
so should be done only “with hesitation” and “as a last resort.”65 We 
can see why: a declaration of unconstitutional overbreadth can in-
validate the legitimate exercise of legislative power right along with 
the illegitimate. To return to the “naked minor” statute discussed 
above, application of the overbreadth doctrine brings down the 
senseless prohibition against pediatric medical texts—but also the 
sensible prohibition against child pornography. As a result, the 
Court has fashioned a number of limitations on the doctrine, for 
instance declining to apply it unless the statute suffers from sub-
stantial overbreadth66 or if a statute’s facially overbroad language 
has been narrowed by a definitive judicial interpretation.67
For purposes of this article we need not attend to the nuances of 
the overbreadth doctrine. It suffices to note that statutes that try to 
suppress hate speech and extremism may extend too far and en-
compass expression and association that warrant protection. In-
deed, laws targeting extremism are particularly prone to such over-
reach precisely because legislatures will (rightly) conclude that
some extremist ideologies and behaviors are gravely worrisome 
and so (wrongly) assume that those threats demand a correspond-
ingly expansive statutory solution. An ironic result follows: if a leg-
islature sees the dangers as less ominous, then it may have little dif-
ficulty crafting a statute that is surgical in its precision; in contrast, 
if a legislature believes that a category of speech or association pre-
sents a grave and meaningful threat, then it may gravitate toward 
just the sort of vague and overbroad laws that the courts find inva-
lid. The congressional responses to the perceived evils of Com-
munism provide historical cases in point, but the phenomenon is 
common, as is more recently demonstrated by legislative efforts to 
regulate violent video games.
63. Len Niehoff, Doe v. University of Michigan: Free Speech on Campus 25 Years Later, 71 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 375–76 (2017).
64. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 769–70.
67. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). For further discussion see infra
text accompanying notes 83–91.
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4. Legislative Rationales: Provocation and Injury Consequences
The principles of vagueness and overbreadth explain why labels 
like “extremist” or “hate speech” have little or no utility in fashion-
ing laws. A law simply forbidding “extremist speech and associa-
tion,” to take an obvious example, would be so hopelessly vague as 
to provide no guidance whatsoever as to its meaning and scope. 
We might understand that such a label encompasses groups that 
promote norms that our society rejects in its laws and policies—
such as segregation, anti-Semitism, racially targeted crime, and 
genocide. But it arguably also encompasses any group whose views 
lie outside the mainstream, including groups who expressly reject 
agendas of violence. A law so vaguely framed might also take in the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle Association, 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the American Family 
Association, and Greenpeace—all groups that (like them or not) 
have contributed meaningfully to public debate around important 
issues.
Indeed, legislative efforts to get at the perceived evils of certain 
speech or association have historically made almost no use of the 
concept of extremism or the label “extremist.” Instead, they have 
overwhelmingly focused on addressing the consequences that may 
follow from particular kinds of speech and expressive association. 
Those consequences fall into two general categories: (a) those 
where the speech provokes someone—for example, inciting them to 
respond immediately and violently to what has been said; and (b) 
those where the speech injures someone—for example, by making 
them feel threatened, attacked, or emotionally wounded. To be 
clear, these consequences are not mutually exclusive—a person 
who feels threatened may react violently out of an impulse toward 
self-defense. But it is helpful to recognize that legislative efforts 
here generally attempt to address just one of these two kinds of 
concerns, which this article will call “provocation consequences”
and “injury consequences.”
We might think that fashioning laws based on identified conse-
quences, rather than on unclear and expansive labels like “hate”
and “extremist,” would yield statutes that avoided vagueness and 
overbreadth problems. A long history of Supreme Court prece-
dent, however, shows otherwise. Indeed, vagueness and over-
breadth issues have plagued, and invalidated, numerous laws that 
sought to address either provocation or injury consequences.
Consider, for example, the early case of Terminiello v. Chicago,
which involved a Chicago ordinance prohibiting “disorderly con-
duct,” which, as the statute defined it, amounted to a provocation 
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consequence.68 In that case, Father Arthur Terminiello, a Catholic 
priest who had been suspended by his Bishop, gave a ranting anti-
Semitic speech to a large, assembled group while protestors pick-
eted and grew increasingly angry outside.69 A jury found him guilty 
under the ordinance, but a majority of the Supreme Court found 
the law unconstitutional and reversed.
Most of what we know about the actual substance of Terminiel-
lo’s speech comes from the dissent filed by Justice Jackson. Jackson 
noted that, although Terminiello disclaimed being a fascist, his 
speech followed “with fidelity that is more than coincidental, the 
pattern of European fascist leaders.”70 His virulent attacks on Jews 
and Communists drew enthusiastic support from his audience, who 
sympathetically called out such phrases as “[T]he Jews are all kill-
ers, murderers. If we don’t kill them first, they will kill us”; “[S]end 
the Jews back to Russia”; “Kill the Jews”; and religious epithets.71
Jackson could not help mocking the majority’s short and sanitized 
description of the content and context of Terminiello’s speech, 
charging his colleagues with treating the priest as if he were “a
modern Demosthenes practicing his [orations] on a lonely sea-
shore.”72
Despite the inflammatory nature of Terminiello’s speech—and 
the response to it—the Court held that his conviction under the 
ordinance violated the First Amendment.73 Although the Court 
had not yet formally recognized the overbreadth doctrine, it essen-
tially applied the analysis we associate with it. Of course, the City of 
Chicago could adopt an ordinance that prohibited disorderly con-
duct in some forms. Here, however, the judge had instructed the
jury that the phrase “breach of the peace” in the ordinance includ-
ed speech that “stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings 
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance.”74 As noted 
above, these are provocation consequences.
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance, so interpreted and 
applied, reached too far. As the Court observed, a great deal of 
valuable speech offends, upsets, and antagonizes people. The 
Court declared that “a function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfac-
68. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3, 5 (1949).
69. Id. at 14–15 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 4.
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tion with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”75 A
statute that punishes speech simply because it makes people en-
raged or agitated encompasses expression that we view as demo-
cratically legitimate, indeed indispensable to political change.
Twenty years later, the Court had occasion to review a law that 
targeted a somewhat narrower class of speech and association, that 
which specifically advocated for or defended the use of violence—
again, a provocation consequence. Brandenburg v. Ohio76 involved a 
speech by Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, at a rally 
of the organization at a farm in Ohio. Dressed in Klan regalia, 
Brandenburg warned that “some revengeance” might have to be 
taken in response to government efforts to “suppress the white, 
Caucasian race” and declared that blacks “should be returned to 
Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.”77 News crews filmed the event 
and portions of it were broadcast on a local television station and a 
national television network.
Brandenburg was charged with violating the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism statute, which swept expansively. Among other things, 
it allowed for the punishment of anyone who advocated for or 
taught violence as a means of accomplishing political reform, or 
who justified the commission of such violence, or who assembled 
with others to engage in such advocacy or teaching.78 Again, this 
case pre-dates the Court’s more formal recognition of the over-
breadth doctrine, but the Court held the statute invalid because it 
reached too far.
Although the statute covered speech that the First Amendment 
does not protect—specifically, incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tion—it also encompassed “mere advocacy,” that is, the discussion 
and promotion of certain ideas without more.79 Citing a line of ear-
lier cases, the Court stressed that “the mere abstract teaching . . . of 
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force 
and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent ac-
tion and steeling it to such action.”80 The Court continued: “A stat-
ute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon 
the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Consti-
tution has immunized from governmental control.”81
75. Id.
76. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
77. Id. at 446–47.
78. See id. at 448.
79. Id. at 447–49.
80. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
81. Id. It is worth noting that the Court’s description of a permissible version of such a 
statute—as one that prohibits groups from preparing for violent action that they begin to 
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Over the course of the next few decades, legislative attention 
shifted from the provocation consequences of extremist speech to 
the injury consequences. Certainly, concepts like “disorderly con-
duct,” “syndicalism,” and “incitement” continued to be invoked as 
bases for punishing extreme speech and association. But, particu-
larly following the passage of federal and state civil rights laws, the 
emphasis moved decidedly toward protecting the victims of ex-
tremism and addressing their injuries, such as fear, alarm, emo-
tional distress, marginalization, and interference with their peace-
ful enjoyment of rights and privileges. In the process, states, local 
units of government, and universities adopted laws and policies at-
tempting to get at the evils of what we have come to label “hate 
speech.”82
One such law that found its way to the Supreme Court was the 
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance adopted by the city of St. Paul, 
Minnesota in 1990. That ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, ob-
ject, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but 
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.83
We can, without much difficulty, imagine the likely thought pro-
cess of the St. Paul city council: (a) some symbols, like burning 
crosses or Nazi swastikas, are intended to provoke anger, outrage, 
and fear among certain minority populations; (b) those symbols 
carry great and personal social costs without contributing any off-
setting benefits to public discourse; (c) therefore, we should adopt 
an ordinance that addresses the evils of such symbols and does so 
comprehensively.
pursue—resembles the territory covered by many laws that bar criminal conspiracies. I will 
return to this point later when I discuss the operational arguments against trying to restrict 
extremist speech and the question of whether the concept of extremism adds anything to 
what we seek to prohibit.
82. One of the earliest forays into the prohibition of “hate speech” on a university cam-
pus involved the student code adopted at the University of Michigan, which was held to vio-
late the First Amendment. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 
1989). For a discussion of Doe and its implications for current discussions around university 
regulation of student speech, see Niehoff, supra note 63.
83. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). The ordinance takes an intri-
guing approach: it identifies injury consequences (“anger, alarm, resentment”), but wraps 
them in the language of a provocation consequence (“disorderly conduct”). The ordinance 
is, however, unmistakably focused on attempting to address the injury consequences of ex-
tremism.
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Unfortunately, the St. Paul ordinance demonstrates the natural 
impulse toward over-legislation that I described earlier, resulting in 
conspicuous problems of vagueness and overbreadth. Consider this 
example: Let’s say that I own a copy of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, which 
I keep in the private library of my home. The cover of the book is 
festooned with images of swastikas. Am I in violation of the ordi-
nance? Well, perhaps: on its face, the ordinance reaches private
property and specifically prohibits the display of this symbol. Do I 
“know” or “have reasonable grounds to know” that the book cover 
will cause any of the various mental states described on the part of 
someone who enters my home and sees it? Again, perhaps—but 
how can I tell? Under what circumstances (if any) should I reason-
ably expect that someone visiting me might feel angry or resentful 
upon seeing the cover and those symbols? If the ordinance doesn’t
extend to my ownership and private display of the book, then how 
do I know that from its language? And, if it does, then isn’t the or-
dinance overly broad—and absurdly so?
The Supreme Court, considering this ordinance in R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, decided that it did not need to reach these issues.84 It so 
concluded because the Supreme Court of Minnesota had inter-
preted the ordinance in a way that at least arguably solved its se-
vere overbreadth problem. Specifically, the state’s highest court 
had construed the ordinance to cover only “fighting words”—that 
is, insulting words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend 
to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”85 This includes “those 
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary 
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to 
provoke violent reaction.”86
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,87 the Court had identified such 
words as lying outside the scope of First Amendment protection. 
After Chaplinsky, however, the precise contours of the doctrine 
came into question as the Court narrowed it substantially—for ex-
ample, limiting it to instances of a “direct personal insult” to a tar-
geted individual likely to respond with violence.88 In R.A.V., the pe-
titioner and some amici curiae urged the Court to revisit the 
“fighting words” doctrine, to limit it still further, and to declare the 
ordinance overbroad.89 The Court deemed this an unnecessary 
step and so declined to take it.
84. Id. at 377.
85. Id. at 381 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
86. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573).
87. Chaplinski, 315 U.S. 568.
88. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
89. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
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For present purposes, the critical point is that if the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had not dramatically narrowed the ordinance, then 
the Supreme Court would certainly have found it substantially 
overbroad and therefore invalid. Indeed, in order to save the ordi-
nance, the Minnesota court had to perform such dramatic surgery 
on it as to leave it almost unrecognizable: the actual language of 
the law bears only the faintest resemblance to the terms of the 
fighting words doctrine. That the ordinance required such an ex-
tensive and imaginative reconstruction says a great deal about its 
initial overbreadth.
Although the Court did not reach the overbreadth issue, it did 
find the ordinance unconstitutional on other grounds. The Court 
observed that the ordinance prohibited only some “fighting 
words”—specifically, those that insulted people based on “race, 
color, creed, religion or gender.” But, the Court pointed out, the 
statute did not proscribe “abusive invective, no matter how vicious 
or severe,” in connection with the conveying of other potentially 
offensive ideas—for example, “to express hostility . . . on the basis 
of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.”90
The Court declared that the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to “impose special prohibitions on those speakers who 
express views on disfavored subjects”—precisely what St. Paul did 
through its ordinance here.91 I will return to this point later, when 
I discuss the operational and conscientious arguments raised 
against the regulation of hate speech and extremist association.
The Court again considered laws directed toward the injury con-
sequences of extreme speech and association in Snyder v. Phelps.92
In that case, the father of a deceased soldier sued members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church on a variety of theories after they picket-
ed near the memorial service held for his son. Westboro’s adher-
ents believe that the United States has become too tolerant of ho-
mosexuality and that God punishes the country for that sin by, 
among other things, killing off its troops. The signs displayed by 
the church during their picketing reflected these beliefs, declar-
ing, for example: “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11”;
“America is Doomed”; “Don’t Pray for the USA”; “Thank God for 
IEDs”; “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”; and “You’re going to 
hell.”93 The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor on his 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion 
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
93. Id. at 448.
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upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy, awarding him compensatory 
and punitive damages totaling more than ten million dollars.94
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court began by noting that 
the messages on the protestors’ signs—while not “refined social or 
political commentary”—did address issues of public concern: the 
“political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, 
the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military,” and other 
matters.95 The Court further observed that the signs plainly reflect-
ed the sincerely held beliefs of these individuals.96 And, finally, the 
Court pointed out that the protestors had expressed their views 
peacefully and at a public place adjacent to a street.97 This combi-
nation of factors meant that Westboro’s speech was entitled to
“special protection” under the First Amendment, and could not be 
restricted simply because it was upsetting or aroused contempt.98 In 
so ruling, the Court did not downplay the injury consequences of 
the speech and assembly in question; to the contrary, it acknowl-
edged that the protestors’ conduct had undoubtedly added still 
more anguish to the plaintiff’s “already incalculable grief.”99
The Court expressed particular concern over the state law tort 
standard for finding intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
which the trial court instructed the jury to apply: “outrageous-
ness.”100 The Court noted that this “highly malleable standard” has 
“an inherent subjectiveness about it.”101 This gives rise to two con-
cerns. First, the standard is so mysterious and expansive as to 
amount to no standard at all; indeed, it seems clear that if a state 
adopted a statute penalizing “outrageous speech” the Court would 
promptly strike it down on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. 
Second, this “highly malleable standard” gives jurors the vast dis-
cretion to punish speech simply because they dislike it; it allows “a
jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views.”102
I will return to this theme in the next section of the Article when I 
explore operational problems.
In the course of its long history, the Supreme Court has not 
struck down every law that targeted extreme speech and associa-
tion as vague or overly broad. One notable early exception is Beau-
94. Id. at 450.
95. Id. at 454.
96. Id. at 455.
97. Id. at 456.
98. Id. at 458.
99. See id. at 456. See also id. at 460–61 (noting that the church’s speech “is certainly 
hurtful” and “inflict[ed] great pain”).
100. Id. at 458.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
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harnais v. Illinois,103 where the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
a statute that bears a close resemblance to the “hate speech” laws 
for which many people advocate today.104 In pertinent part, the 
statute read:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to 
manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, 
present or exhibit in any public place in this state any lith-
ograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which pub-
lication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, un-
chastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, 
color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibi-
tion exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or reli-
gion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is produc-
tive of breach of the peace or riots . . . .105
The Court—applying the law as it existed in the middle part of the 
twentieth century—upheld the statute by following this line of rea-
soning: (a) the First Amendment affords no protection to defama-
tory speech directed against an individual; (b) the defamation of 
certain racial and religious groups has led to all sorts of evils, in-
cluding discrimination, property destruction, and violence; (c) 
therefore, the State of Illinois was free to adopt a law that prohibit-
ed the defamation of classes of citizens by reference to their race, 
color, creed, or faith.106 This argument is not without its logical 
force or appeal, and if First Amendment doctrine had stopped 
evolving in 1952, it would likely still be the law.
As we have seen throughout this section, however, subsequent 
developments unsettled the reasoning of Beauharnais. In New York 
Times v. Sullivan,107 the Court concluded that state defamation law 
does not lie entirely outside of the concerns of the First Amend-
ment, which must limit tort principles in order to ensure that 
speech is adequately protected. In Brandenburg,108 the Court de-
clared that incendiary speech must be likely to incite imminent vio-
lence before the state can prohibit it. In Snyder,109 the Court 
103. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
104. See Levin, supra note 8, at 725 (noting the similarity between the group libel statute 
at issue in Beauharnais and anti-hate-speech statutes that have been adopted in other coun-
tries). See also Pascal Mbongo, Hate Speech, Extreme Speech, and Collective Defamation in French 
Law, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 221 (addressing the French con-
cept of “collective defamation”).
105. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 277 n.1.
106. Id. at 254-61.
107. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
108. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
109. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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stressed the “special protection” that attaches to speech on matters 
of public interest—which can include unpleasantly sharp attacks 
on groups. Although the Court has never formally overruled Beau-
harnais, these later developments eclipse its reasoning and render 
it doctrinally obsolete.
Furthermore, a statute like that under consideration in Beauhar-
nais could not survive the Court’s current tests for overbreadth and 
vagueness—at least absent a saving construction. Consider, for ex-
ample, the recent editorial cartoon by Pat Oliphant viciously lam-
pooning the Catholic Church’s sex abuse scandal: a mob of sex-
crazed priests chases a group of children from a sanctuary over the 
caption “Celebration of Spring at St. Paedophilia’s—the Annual 
Running of the Altar Boys.” Read literally, the statute would appear 
to criminalize the drawing, which portrays “depravity, criminality, 
unchastity, [and] a lack of virtue” on a “class of citizens” of a par-
ticular “religion,” exposing them to “contempt, derision, or oblo-
quy.”110
The Beauharnais statute is also distressingly vague. It leaves 
members of the public to guess about the meaning of words and 
phrases like “depravity,” “lack of virtue,” “derision,” and “obloquy.”
Consider this: If I express the opinion that members of the white 
race are condescending toward members of the black, have I vio-
lated the statute? Have I impermissibly portrayed a “lack of virtue”
on behalf of a class of citizens based on their race in a manner that 
will “expose them to derision?” Who knows? For all of these rea-
sons, the Court’s early analysis of the anti-hate-speech-style statute 
in Beauharnais offers us little more than a cautionary tale about 
some of the things that can go wrong when we try to prohibit ex-
tremist expression and association.
To sum up: efforts to regulate, prohibit, and punish extremist 
speech and association necessarily encounter those definitional 
difficulties that are reflected in our concepts of vagueness and 
overbreadth—and even in our foundational concept of due pro-
cess. Because we plainly cannot solve them by using labels like “ex-
tremist group” or “hate speech,” legislatures have historically fo-
cused on the provocation consequences and injury consequences 
that they believe likely follow from such speech and association. 
This has, alas, simply led them into different sets of vagueness and 
overbreadth problems. As I will discuss in the next two sections, 
however, these are neither the only nor, perhaps, the greatest chal-
lenges that efforts to control extremism face.
110. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
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B. Operational Arguments
In addition to the definitional challenges outlined above, laws 
targeting hate speech and extremist association can pose signifi-
cant problems in implementation. One threshold issue here comes 
from the fact that at the implementation stage we may discover 
that a law specifically targeting extremism turns out to be unneces-
sary. Furthermore, in light of the vagueness and overbreadth risks 
inherent in drafting statutes directed specifically toward extrem-
ism, the incremental value of such laws (if any) may be outweighed 
by the risk of their invalidity. And, ironically, in the implementa-
tion process, such laws could end up harming the very populations 
they were intended to protect.
The cases discussed in the prior section reflect a very low toler-
ance for vagueness and overbreadth in laws that seek to regulate, 
prohibit, and punish speech and association. In R.A.V., we also en-
countered an extremely high doctrinal hostility toward laws that 
target speech based on its content and viewpoint. Indeed, the 
Court has historically considered viewpoint discrimination to be 
among the most serious and unjustifiable of First Amendment vio-
lations—a point to which I will return in the next section.
If we accept the rationales that underlie the Supreme Court’s
keen sensitivity to vagueness and overbreadth, then the legal terri-
tory available for restrictions on hate speech and extremist associa-
tion may appear to be very limited. As noted above, unclear terms 
of uncertain scope like “hate speech,” “hate group,” “extremist 
group,” and “alt-association” may have a place in relatively low-
definitional high-abstraction public discourse, but they cannot 
serve to define a legally proscribed category. And, as discussed, 
vagueness and overbreadth problems will often persist as we move 
our thinking and language toward the consequences of such 
speech and association, attempting to address the provocations 
and injuries they may cause.
That we find ourselves with limited legal territory, however, does 
not mean that none exists at all. To the contrary, many of the evils 
we connect with extremism are evils in and of themselves, and the 
law proscribes them regardless of their ideological origins. Consid-
er, for example, the speech that First Amendment doctrine calls a 
“true threat.” The law can, and does, criminalize the making of a 
true threat to someone’s life or physical well-being, and it can, and 
will, punish the individual for making the offending statement 
without any consideration of whether he or she did so because of a 
political impulse, or a sincerely held religious belief, or a mean 
streak, or a bad hand at the poker table.
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We find an example of this principle in Virginia v. Black.111 That 
case concerned a Virginia statute that banned cross burning with 
“an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”112 Although 
Black involved a variety of legal issues and consolidated several dif-
ferent cases, I will focus here on the constitutionality of the princi-
pal provision of the statute and on defendants Elliott and O’Mara, 
because these offer the most useful insights into implementation 
challenges for our purposes.
These are the salient facts: James Jubilee, an African American, 
lived next door to Elliott. Elliott apparently used the backyard of 
his home as a firing range and enjoyed shooting guns there. After 
Jubilee complained to Elliott’s mother, Elliott and his friend 
O’Mara decided to take retribution by planting a cross in Jubilee’s
front yard and setting it on fire.
Neither Elliott nor O’Mara claimed any affiliation with the Ku 
Klux Klan, and Jubilee did not discover the partially burned cross 
until the next morning. Jubilee nevertheless understood the omi-
nous implications of the cross and felt anxious about what it por-
tended. The police identified Elliott and O’Mara as the perpetra-
tors and arrested them. A jury found Elliott guilty of violating the 
statute and O’Mara pleaded guilty to doing so, reserving the right 
to challenge the constitutionality of the law on appeal.113
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion for the Court. Af-
ter reciting the facts of the various cases, she provided a detailed 
account of the history of the Ku Klux Klan and its use of cross 
burning as “a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending vio-
lence.”114 She noted that cross burning had become a “symbol of 
hate” that was used to “threaten or menace” other people, even by 
individuals (like Elliott and O’Mara) who had no affiliation with 
the Klan.115
Turning to legal principles, Justice O’Connor observed that the 
First Amendment does not protect “true threats,” which she de-
fined as “those statements where the speaker means to communi-
cate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”116 The 
111. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
112. Id. at 347.
113. Id. at 350-51.
114. Id. at 354.
115. Id. at 357. By “no affiliation,” I mean no membership or other formal connection. 
In my view, someone who burns a cross on the lawn of an African American does indeed 
“affiliate” with the traditions and symbols of the Klan. For our purposes, however, what mat-
ters here is that Elliott and O’Mara were being prosecuted for an act of intimidating cross 
burning, without any necessity to delve into questions of their individual ideologies.
116. Id. at 359.
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Virginia statute in question targeted cross burning done with the 
“intent to intimidate.”117 To this extent, it posed no problem under 
the First Amendment.
The Court held this provision of the Virginia statute constitu-
tional because it proscribed the use of cross burning to intimidate 
and threaten, regardless of the politics or ideology that the assaul-
tive gesture also conveyed—if it conveyed any at all. Indeed, as Jus-
tice O’Connor noted, the case involving Elliott and O’Mara 
demonstrated the point: the state prosecuted them under the stat-
ute despite the fact that it was “at least unclear” whether they 
“burned a cross due to racial animus.”118 The statute applied to 
them even if their sole motivation was to convey to Jubilee that he 
should make no further complaints about Elliott’s firearms prac-
tice and even if they were unaware of his race.
At first blush, it may seem difficult to reconcile the constitution-
al validity of the anti-cross-burning Virginia statute with the invalid-
ity of the anti-cross-burning ordinance at issue in R.A.V. Justice 
O’Connor explained that the ordinance at issue in R.A.V. failed to 
pass constitutional muster because it punished cross burning only 
when it reflected particular viewpoints, imposing “special prohibi-
tions on those speakers who express views on disfavored sub-
jects.”119 While the First Amendment generally precludes that kind 
of “content discrimination,” it does not restrain the state from pro-
scribing speech “based on the very reasons why the speech at issue 
is proscribable”—for example, because it is a true threat.120 The 
Court offered this example to clarify: the First Amendment does 
not prevent Congress from passing a law that prohibits true threats 
against the life of the President of the United States, but the First 
Amendment does preclude it from passing a law that prohibits true 
threats against the President because of his or her policies toward 
inner cities.121 Both address threats, but the latter carves out a dis-
favored viewpoint for proscription while the former does not.
In a sense, Black simply confirms what we already knew: the state 
has the authority to criminalize and punish true threats. This is an 
unremarkable proposition. After all, the state can criminalize and 
117. Id. at 362.
118. Id. at 363.
119. Id. at 361; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (“Whoever 
places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffi-
ti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”).
120. Black, 538 U.S. at 362 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393).
121. See id. at 363.
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punish many behaviors that usually take place primarily through 
speech, including blackmail, extortion, bribery, fraud, solicitation, 
and conspiracy.122
But Black has other, more nuanced lessons for us as well. First, 
note that describing the Virginia statute as an anti-extremism 
measure adds nothing to the legal analysis—even if the statute 
proves to be a useful tool against violent extremists.123 After all, by 
its terms the statute applies with equal force to those who do not 
seek to advance extremist ideologies, like Elliott and O’Mara, and 
those who do, like Black—another of the parties to the case and a
leader of the Ku Klux Klan whose cross burning took place at a ral-
ly filled with racist and anti-Semitic vitriol.124 We do not need an 
“anti-extremism threat law” to get at extremist threats; any old true 
threat law will permit us to do that, and more.
Second, the Virginia legislature might well have rendered this 
statute invalid if it had tried to frame the law as a weapon targeted 
specifically against extremism. Doing so would almost inevitably 
move the language of the statute away from content that the First 
Amendment allows the state to proscribe (the threat and intimida-
tion) and toward the content that it does not (the viewpoint and 
ideology). Expressly focusing a statute on extremism therefore may 
not just be unnecessary; it may be fatal to the very effort at hand.
Accordingly, we should not equate agreeing with the Supreme 
Court’s sensitivity to narrowness and overbreadth problems with 
despairing over our ability to do anything meaningful to combat 
extremism. We have many tools available to do so. But adding 
more tools, and explicitly casting them as anti-extremism 
measures, may be, in Bernard Williams’s trenchant phrase, the 
122. For a discussion and partial list of such crimes and related prosecutions, see Levin, 
supra note 8, at 734–35, 749–51. In addition, the state can—without running afoul of the 
First Amendment—provide civil remedies for some of the evils we associate with extremism, 
such as assault, battery, conspiracy, trespass, and various forms of discriminatory treatment. 
Id. at 735-36. Of course, what these laws do not do is address certain words, phrases, symbols, 
or ideas as malum in se—that is, as sufficiently evil in and of themselves that we need not look 
for additional social or individual harms in order to prohibit them. It has been argued that 
one such idea is Holocaust denial. See David Fraser, ‘On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a 
Nazi’: Some Comparative Legal Aspects of Holocaust Denial on the WWW, in EXTREME SPEECH AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 511. In such cases, it might be that we can identify the offensive 
idea with crystalline specificity and that we can get at a different evil than do existing crimi-
nal and other laws. We will, however, still have to contend with the arguments I discuss infra 
in Part II C and the question of whether we want to grant the government the potentially 
Orwellian authority to ban certain ideas.
123. For a discussion of whether hate speech laws are truly necessary to address the most 
significant harms of such speech, or are redundant with the work done by existing laws, see
L. W. Sumner, Incitement and Regulation of Hate Speech in Canada: A Philosophical Analysis, in
EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 204.
124. See Black, 538 U.S. at 348-49.
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“one thought too many.”125 Indeed, it may be the thought that ren-
ders the tool invalid and useless.
The passage and existence of anti-hate or anti-extremism laws 
may have significant symbolic value to affected groups, regardless 
of whether they actually contribute substantively to the available 
remedies. Thus, we might advocate for such laws even when they 
are almost entirely redundant with existing measures. In my view, 
however, any such strategy has troublesome downsides. First, the 
strategy is disingenuous, holding out as new something that in fact 
is not. Second, it reeks of condescension, assuming that affected 
populations will not detect the ruse. Finally, to the extent that the 
measure does attempt to address hate speech and extremist associa-
tion in novel and experimental ways, it may wander into fatal prob-
lems of vagueness and overbreadth and a court will strike it down. 
Through this very process, failed hate speech and anti-extremism 
laws sometimes become an entirely different kind of symbol—a
symbol suggesting that the legal system does not take these issues 
seriously and leaves us with a problem unsolvable through the in-
struments of the law.
Of course, all of the arguments I just detailed might fail to per-
suade a person who quarrels with their premise, that is, that the 
Supreme Court’s low tolerance for vagueness and overbreadth in 
this area makes sense. Such an individual might say that she thinks 
that people are not so easily chilled as the Court assumes, that 
speech and association have shown themselves to be extraordinari-
ly resilient, and that little or no harm to free expression would like-
ly occur if the First Amendment accommodated a less-than-precise 
law like the St. Paul ordinance. She might even contend that the 
Court’s hostility toward vagueness and overbreadth reflects an atti-
tude of privilege, the sort of doctrine that could be crafted only by 
those who will not personally suffer the consequences of providing 
such expansive protection to extremist expression. If we allowed 
for more play in the joints here, she might ask, how bad would 
things be?
I think the answer is: very, very bad. To understand why, let’s as-
sume that the St. Paul ordinance discussed above passed the 
Court’s tests for specificity and narrowness. Advocates against ex-
tremist speech and association would likely see this as a tremen-
dous victory, putting into the hands of law enforcement officers 
and prosecutors a new instrument to cut some of the most perni-
cious cancers from our society. If a neo-Nazi swastika-waving group 
125. See Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, in MORAL LUCK (James 
Rachels ed., 1981).
SUMMER 2019] Policing Hate Speech and Extremism 891
planned to march again in Skokie past the homes of Holocaust 
survivors, this time around the police could intervene and send 
them packing or—better still—haul them off to jail.126
Laws so ambiguous in meaning and scope, however, make poor 
surgical instruments. As the Court recognized more than eighty 
years ago in Herndon, once implemented, vague laws introduce an 
element of unfettered discretion that leaves speech vulnerable to 
punishment because it is unpopular—not because it poses any real 
danger or inflicts any actual injury. As noted earlier, vague laws can 
in this sense turn the animating philosophy of the First Amend-
ment on its head, shielding only the popular speech that doesn’t
need its protection while allowing for punishment of the unpopu-
lar speech that does.
Even precise and narrow laws leave room for abuse. Law en-
forcement officials and prosecutors have substantial discretion in
deciding which individuals should be arrested, charged, given a 
deal, and taken to trial. Juries—their ostensible duty to follow the 
court’s instructions aside—have substantial discretion in deciding 
cases. Trial judges have substantial discretion on many fronts, in-
cluding in deciding evidentiary issues, and the applicable standard 
of review may give an appellate court the room to forgive a trial 
court that got something wrong. Again, all these risks exist even 
when a law does not suffer from vagueness or overbreadth issues. 
They multiply exponentially when a law leaves still more room for 
irregular and idiosyncratic application.
Vague and overbroad laws can therefore have consequences un-
intended by their champions. Indeed, the experiments of other 
countries with amorphous and wide-ranging “hate laws” confirm 
that this is so. Consider this striking example: “[i]n 2008, film star 
Brigitte Bardot was convicted by French authorities for placing 
online a letter to president Nicolas Sarkozy in which she com-
plained about the Islamic practice of ritual animal slaughter. It was 
her fifth conviction for hate speech.”127 It seems wholly implausible 
that the drafters of this law believed that any significant evils flowed 
from movie stars expressing their concern, non-violently, produc-
tively, and without threat to Muslim people or practices, for the 
well-being of animals—and, if they did, it seems equally implausi-
ble they were right. But the state prosecuted and convicted her an-
yway—five times.
126. For an exploration of First Amendment theory that uses the Skokie, Illinois case as 
its launching point and central example, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 
(1988).
127. ERWIN CHEMERISNSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 107 (2017).
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Indeed, vague and overbroad anti-extremism laws carry with 
them the substantial risk that they will be used against the very or-
ganizations that most aggressively push for political change on be-
half of minority populations and against the very minority popula-
tions that have been, and remain, the primary targets of extremist 
ideologies. As Erik Nielsen recently observed, “‘hate’ is a danger-
ously elastic label, one that has long been used in America to de-
monize unpopular expression. If we become overzealous in our ef-
forts to limit so-called hate speech, we run the risk of setting a trap 
for the very people we’re trying to defend.”128 Nielsen offered as 
examples the black nationalists of the 1960s and 1970s, Malcolm X, 
the Nation of Islam, the Black Panthers, the Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, and the Black Lives Matter 
Movement.129 The concept of “extremism” is no less elastic. For ex-
ample, the Anti-Defamation League has pointed out that in its 
time, the abolitionist movement qualified as “extremist.”130 Pushing 
for laws that punish “hate” and “extremism” may end up arming 
the opposition.
The wild indeterminacy of the concepts of “extremism” and 
“hate” is demonstrated by looking at how the Southern Poverty 
Law Center (SPLC), which identifies “hate” and “extremist” groups 
and individuals and monitors their activities, has treated the organ-
izations identified by Nielsen.131 As Nielsen points out, the SPLC 
identifies the Nation of Islam as a hate group.132 On the other 
hand, some far-right conservative groups have criticized the SPLC 
for not identifying the BDS as such.133 Ironically, one of the leading 
organizations to voice this concern is the Family Research Council, 
which the SPLC does identify as an extremist group because of its 
antagonism toward gays and lesbians.134 Is the SPLC itself guilty of 
spreading hate? A “former Islamic radical,” Maajid Nawaz, appar-
128. Erik Nielson, If We Silence Hate Speech, Will We Silence Resistance?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/opinion/if-we-silence-hate-speech-
will-we-silence-resistance.html?emc=edit_th_180810&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=
663780750810.
129. Id.
130. See Defining Extremism: A Glossary of White Supremacist Terms, Movements and Philoso-
phies, ADL, https://www.adl.org/education/resources/glossary-terms/defining-extremism-
white-supremacy (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); see also David J. Bodney, Extreme Speech and Amer-
ican Press Freedoms, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 598, 599 
(“[E]xtreme speech is a highly elastic term, broad enough to encompass the writings of Jef-
ferson, the pages of Hustler magazine, and the torch-lit passages of Mein Kampf.”).
131. In the interest of full disclosure, the author is a regular donor to the SPLC.
132. Nielson, supra note 128.
133. See Caleb Parke, Report: Southern Poverty Law Center Ignores Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes on 
Campus, FOX NEWS (Mar. 7, 2018) http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/03/07/report-
southern-poverty-law-center-ignores-anti-semitic-hate-crimes-on-campus.html.
134. Id.; Extremist Files: Family Research Council, SPLC.ORG, https://www.splcenter.org/
fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/family-research-council (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
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ently thought so and therefore sued the SPLC for including him in 
its “Field Guide to Anti-Muslim Extremists”—a lawsuit that resulted 
in a settlement payment of $3.375 million by the SPLC, along with 
an apology.135
To sum up, when we arrive at the implementation stage of anti-
extremism law, we are likely to encounter fresh problems. Such 
laws may be unnecessary. In our effort to ensure that they seem
necessary—that they “add something” to the legal landscape—we 
may focus them on particular content and viewpoints and thereby 
invalidate them. And, if we could affect a significant change in First 
Amendment doctrine so as to give us greater definitional and op-
erational latitude, we might recoil at the way the state ends up en-
forcing those laws. Having pushed for progressive measures, we 
could discover ourselves on the receiving end of proscriptions that 
are indeterminate, unclear, overreaching, and based on the rela-
tive unpopularity of our views. Permit me to stress: I offer here not 
the irrational anxieties of an overwrought imagination, but a his-
torically informed description of the bogeyman that actually lives 
under the bed.
C.  Conscientious Arguments
What if we could overcome the objections detailed in the prior 
two sections? What if we could draft an anti-hate-speech or anti-
extremism law that was clear and not overly broad and that some-
how avoided the implementation problems described above? Do 
any arguments against the effort to police hate speech and extrem-
ism remain? Yes—and they raise foundational questions about the 
entire anti-extremism enterprise.
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has described only 
one freedom as “absolute”—the freedom to “believe.”136 Over and 
over again, the Court has underscored the special constitutional 
sanctity of the human conscience. Thus, the Court has declared 
that “Courts, no more than Constitutions, can intrude into the 
consciences of men or compel them to believe contrary to their 
faith or think contrary to their convictions.”137 The Court gave us its 
most famously poetic expression of this idea in West Virginia State 
135. Marc A. Thiessen, The Southern Poverty Law Center Has Lost All Credibility, WASH. POST
(June 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-southern-poverty-law-
center-has-lost-all-credibility/2018/06/21/22ab7d60-756d-11e8-9780-
b1dd6a09b549_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c403ac8ae66.
136. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
137. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 593–94 (1942).
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Board of Education v. Barnette,138 when it said that “[i]f there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”139
Having said that the Court has treated an individual’s beliefs as 
“sacrosanct,” I need to inject two brief clarifications. The first is a 
practical point. At the risk of stressing the obvious, “[T]he gov-
ernment cannot control individual conscience in any event.”140 The 
metaphysical reality at work here prompted Harry Kalven to note 
wryly that “when belief is silent, it would seem protected not by law, 
but by the sheer impracticability of policing it.”141 The pragmatic 
question therefore becomes not whether the government should 
be able to restrain conscience but whether the government should 
be able to restrain its exercise or expression. This is the very subject 
matter of the First Amendment.
The second point is this: although it is true that the Constitution 
protects matters of conscience, it is also true that the law often 
takes account of mental states and that they can affect legal out-
comes, such as punishment. Consider, for example, common is-
sues of intentionality. The law may treat the same underlying con-
duct very differently depending on whether it was done 
defensively, accidentally, recklessly, or after careful premeditation.
When the law considers intent, however, the government is not 
punishing acts of conscience—or even mental states—as wrongs in 
and of themselves. Rather, the government sensibly recognizes that 
the same act committed with different mental states may reflect 
different levels of culpability and may inflict different levels of 
harm. This principle has significance for the crafting of some im-
portant anti-extremism and anti-hate laws.
The law at issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell provides an example.142
In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Wisconsin 
statute that enhanced the penalty for criminal offenses where the 
defendant had intentionally selected the victim because of his or 
her race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national 
origin, or ancestry. The Court pointed out that the target of the 
statute was the underlying conduct (here, a criminal assault), 
which the First Amendment does not protect. The Court held that 
the statute could enhance the penalty for that underlying wrong 
138. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
139. Id. at 642.
140. Leonard M. Niehoff, What We Believe: Geoffrey Stone’s Perilous Times: Free Speech in War-
time and the Assault on Individual Conscience, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 889, 898 (2005).
141. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 332 
(1988).
142. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)
SUMMER 2019] Policing Hate Speech and Extremism 895
where the act was motivated by bias in order to address the greater 
individual and societal harms that followed as a result.143
In the absence of some independent underlying wrong, howev-
er, restrictions on the activities protected by the First Amendment 
are restrictions of the way in which we human beings take our con-
science out into the world: through our speech, our religious 
choices, our political petitions, and our assembling together to get 
done the things that we care about most deeply. We might think 
here of John Stuart Mill’s formulation. True human liberty, he 
wrote, demands not just protection for “the inward domain of con-
sciousness . . . conscience in the most comprehensive sense . . . of 
thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment 
on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theo-
logical.”144 It also demands “cognate libert[ies],” like speaking, writ-
ing, and associating with others to express opinions and convey 
ideas.145 Or, as Harry Kalven summarized things, “[f]reedom to be-
lieve what one wishes but not to voice those beliefs would be illuso-
ry.”146
One of the principal problems with the project of restricting ex-
tremism is that the extremism that concerns us directly implicates 
the individual human conscience. Someone could, of course, hold 
extremist views about anything, including the benign and the trivi-
al. But the extremism that keeps us up at night involves many of 
the subject matters—like politics, religion, and morality—that we 
see as most deeply matters of individual conscience, choice, and 
identity.
As I noted at the beginning of this article, a book published a 
number of years ago posed the provocative question Must We De-
fend Nazis? In a responsive essay, Alan Dershowitz contended that 
the central argument of that book got things completely wrong: it 
imagines Nazi hate speech as occupying a place on the far borders 
of First Amendment protection; to the contrary, Dershowitz con-
tends, such speech sits at its center. He writes:
Among the book’s most fundamental flaws is its placement 
of Nazi hate speech at the periphery of the First Amend-
ment, when by any reasonable definition it sits at its very 
core. Nude dancing, hard-core porn and commercial ad-
vertising may be peripheral to the political concerns of the 
143. In the same vein, the First Amendment does not bar evidence of beliefs, like racial 
hatred, in order to show motive or to establish intentionality. See Levin, supra note 8, at 743.
144. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (Penguin Books 1982) (1859).
145. Id.; see also id. at 74.
146. KALVEN, supra note 141, at 332.
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First Amendment. Still, according constitutional protection 
to these genres of speech may be necessary to build a wall 
around the core to protect it from the slippery slope. But 
what could be more central than advocacy by the Nazi Party 
of a political program for America? Nazi speech is no more 
peripheral than communist speech. It may be more hateful 
and more dangerous, but to call it peripheral is to misun-
derstand the essential purpose of the First Amendment.147
This argument echoes the view expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Snyder v. Phelps regarding the speech engaged in by the Westboro 
Baptist Church. That speech—odious and hurtful as it was—did 
not squeak its way across the borders of the First Amendment into 
a space that offered only limited and grudging sanctuary. To the 
contrary, it addressed precisely the sort of matters that afforded it 
“special protection”—matters of conscience like politics, religion, 
and the morality of individuals and of a nation.
The Court’s protective approach toward such central matters of 
conscience has long offered shelter to movements we associate 
with the political left. We see this dynamic at work in a number of 
the cases I addressed earlier, including NAACP v. Alabama. The 
Court’s hesitancy to allow the government to meddle in matters of 
conscience (or to do so itself) is perhaps best illustrated, however, 
by its approach to the issue of conscientious objectors. Granted, 
that case law brings into play other areas of legal doctrine, like the 
free exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment. 
But the Court’s extraordinary hesitancy to intrude into matters of 
conscience there should inform our analysis of the laws intended 
to address extremism that I am discussing here.
United States v. Seeger148 addressed a provision of the Selective Ser-
vice Act that stated it would not be construed to “require any per-
son to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed 
forces . . . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is consci-
entiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”149 In perti-
nent part, the provision went on to define “religious training and 
belief” as “an individual’s belief in relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human rela-
147. Alan M. Dershowitz, Dubious Arguments for Curbing the Free Speech of Nazis, Wash. Post
(Feb. 1, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/dubious-arguments-for-curbing-
the-free-speech-of-nazis/2018/01/31/495cd256-fc96-11e7-8f66-2df0b94bb98a_story.html?
utm_term=.4fa99a64032f.
148. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
149. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d. Cir. 1964).
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tion.”150 Seeger claimed conscientious objector status under this
provision.
At trial, Seeger’s counsel candidly admitted that his client’s “be-
lief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly under-
stood,” and, indeed, Seeger himself said that he preferred to treat 
the question of the existence of God as an “open” matter.151 As a 
result, although the government found Seeger’s opposition to war 
to be strong and sincere (and in every other sense “religious”), it 
concluded that he did not qualify for exemption under the Act be-
cause his objections were not based on his “belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being.”152 Seeger was charged with and convicted of refus-
ing to submit to induction.153 His appeal literally presented a ques-
tion of cosmic dimension: were Seeger’s beliefs a religion? If so, 
then the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protected 
them and the Establishment Clause prohibited the government 
from imposing its own favored and contradictory religious views 
upon him.
The Second Circuit ruled for Seeger.154 The court observed that 
“a requirement of a belief in a Supreme Being, no matter how 
broadly defined, cannot embrace all those faiths which can validly 
claim to be called ‘religious.’”155 The court noted that exceptions 
include such “well-established religious sects” as Buddhism, Tao-
ism, and Secular Humanism.156 Belief in a deity is “a belief in some 
particular kind of religious concept,” the court observed, but it is 
certainly not the only kind and the state has no authority to institu-
tionalize it in law as the preferred kind.157 “We are convinced,” the 
court declared, “that the believer in a Supreme Being is not for 
that reason alone more entitled to have his conscience respected 
by a draft board than is Daniel Seeger.”158
The Supreme Court also ruled for Seeger, although on different 
grounds. If the Second Circuit blanched at the idea of the gov-
ernment defining a “religion” in a particular way, the Supreme 
Court had equally little enthusiasm for the idea that the govern-
ment would tell us the meaning of “Supreme Being.” In a long 
opinion laced with legislative history and contemporary theology, 
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the 
150. Id.
151. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166-67.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 166.
154. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846.
155. Id. at 852.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 853.
158. Id. at 854.
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phrase “Supreme Being” to conventional images of God, but rather 
wanted it to extend to anything that occupies the same place in a 
person’s life as would a “traditional deity.”159
The Court ruled that if the draft board had applied this test to 
Seeger it would have reached a different conclusion. Seeger pro-
fessed a religious belief and faith, did not disavow belief in a Su-
preme Being, acknowledged that “the cosmic order does, perhaps, 
suggest a creative intelligence,” and “decried the tremendous ‘spir-
itual’ price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human 
life.”160 The Court concluded by quoting Paul Tillich:
And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, 
translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the 
source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you 
take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do 
so, you must forget everything traditional that you have 
learned about God . . . .161
At the risk of reductionism, the Court essentially held that, for 
purposes of this statute, God is whatever Daniel Andrew Seeger 
sincerely believes God is.
Barnette and Seeger both recognized a fundamental truth: pres-
sure against extremism inherently entails pressure toward ortho-
doxy. In matters of conscience, the Barnette Court saw this as 
treacherous stuff, observing that history has shown that 
“[c]ompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity 
of the graveyard.”162 Nor can we make exceptions simply because 
the noncomforming viewpoint seems pernicious and destabilizing: 
“freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of 
the existing order.”163 In Seeger, the Court saw the strong shove to-
ward orthodoxy created by the Act’s impossible choice: embrace 
the traditional view of God that you reject and go home, or follow 
your conscience and go to prison.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit in Seeger invoked the “dignity”
interest of the individual seeking to exercise his or her individual 
159. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187. I respect the heroic energies at work here to try to save 
the provision from constitutional infirmity, but the gloss on legislative intent strikes me as 
conspicuously implausible.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)) (emphasis 
added).
162. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
163. Id. at 642.
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conscience.164 And, perhaps ironically, the Court framed this point 
in terms that Seeger would likely have found unpalatable: “we here 
respect the right of Daniel Seeger to believe what he will largely be-
cause of the conviction that every individual is a child of God; and 
that Man, created in the image of his Maker, is endowed for that 
reason with human dignity.”165 That Seeger might have bristled 
over this formulation, however, does not matter; the Court hon-
ored the “stern and moral voice of conscience” that he felt com-
pelled to obey.166
Ronald Dworkin has similarly argued that we do better ground-
ing arguments in favor of free expression in a concept of a basic 
and universal human right—specifically, dignity—than in instru-
mentalist models like the marketplace of ideas.167 He describes free 
expression as a “basic principle” of human dignity: “it is illegiti-
mate for governments to impose a collective or official decision on 
dissenting individuals, using the coercive powers of the state, un-
less that decision has been taken in a manner that respects each 
individual’s status as a free and equal member of the communi-
ty.”168 Dworkin sees such liberty as an essential part of “democratic 
background”—one of the non-majoritarian preconditions we must 
have in place for “fair democracy” to run its course.169
Some have argued—and some other countries have conclud-
ed—that policing hate speech and extremism helps safeguard the 
dignity interests of those who are victimized by extremism’s excess-
es.170 We might distinguish here, though, between different kinds 
164. Seeger, 326 F.2d at 848–49. The Supreme Court has itself often invoked individual 
dignity as a basis for First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of free expression is . . . designed and intended to re-
move governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to 
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in . . . the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests.”).
165. Seeger, 326 F.2d at 855.
166. Id. at 853.
167. See Ronald Dworkin, Foreword to EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 
vii.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Those dignity interests are variously framed, for example in terms of privacy, per-
sonality, equality, or self-determination. The argument posits that those interests are distinct 
from and stand in opposition to the interest of free expression and that the state should 
“balance” them against each other to achieve “proportionality.” See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Free-
dom of Speech in a Globalized World, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 13; 
Amnon Reichman, Criminalizing Religiously Offensive Satire: Free Speech, Human Dignity, and 
Comparative Law, in id. at 331. European countries and others have moved in this direction. 
Although space constraints preclude a full discussion of the arguments in opposition to this 
approach, I will note two significant objections. First, such ad hoc balancing has very low 
predictive value—in each individual case, a person must guess at how a court will ultimately 
“balance” his or her conduct against competing considerations. No principle besides a 
vague assurance of “proportionality” informs the analysis. Second, I believe that invocations 
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of dignity. Perhaps the suppression of the dignity of one person 
could, in a specific case, advance the dignity of another. Thus, 
pushing one person away from an extremist ideology and toward 
orthodoxy might make life meaningfully better for someone else. 
But it does nothing for the dignity interest of the person being 
pushed, and we cannot advance the general concept of individual 
dignity—something we theoretically honor in all persons—
through the suppression of the very value it celebrates. Any at-
tempt to do so will consume itself.
Perhaps the state could draft a clear, narrow, and practically 
workable law against hate speech and extremism. It would have its 
advantages. But, make no mistake, it would put officials, “high and 
petty,” in the business of determining what does, and does not, 
qualify as a forbidden and inexpressible belief. Such an approach 
puts in play a blunt instrument of perilous potential, and one, his-
tory suggests, more easily got than got rid of.
CONCLUSION
Tolerance of hate speech and extremist association comes at a 
real and substantial cost. Honorable impulses and commonsense 
intuitions tell us that we need to do something to address them 
and their consequences. Groups targeted by such speech and ideo-
logies, and those who support and empathize with them, have 
grown understandably weary of rote observations about how we 
must bear these costs in furtherance of the paramount interest of 
free speech. To return to my beginning, the move to reform our 
laws to do a better job at policing, prohibiting, and punishing hate 
speech and extremist association is “perfectly logical.”
Nevertheless, it remains true that efforts to suppress extremism 
must account for the definitional, operational, and conscientious 
arguments I describe above. And they will need to do so not just 
because these arguments have a firm basis in law and so will doom 
any effort that runs afoul of them. But also, reform efforts will 
need to navigate through these categories of oppositional argu-
ments because they get at fundamental values that we cannot af-
ford to sacrifice under the pressure of current exigencies. Those 
values include our fundamental commitment to due process and 
of “balancing” in this context are useless in our effort to answer the question before us. 
“Balance” suggests equipoise—that the scales are even. But evenly balanced scales do not tell 
us what decision to make. In order to make a decision, we must achieve an imbalance of the 
scales—that is, we must decide that for some reason one interest outweighs another. Refer-
ences to “balancing” do not give us the reasons that we are after and that we need to make a 
decision.
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procedural fairness, our wariness about investing government offi-
cials with the discretion to punish the unpopular, and our belief in 
the sanctity of the human conscience. There are good reasons to 
fear that, if the fight against extremism departs from those norms, 
it will itself become just another form of extremism, another tool 
of oppression, and another whipcord driving human hearts and 
minds toward orthodoxy and, finally, “the unanimity of the grave-
yard.”

